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In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed 
buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer 
a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total 
surplus is not different from the symmetric information benchmark, while in the bad state, 
private information may be welfare-reducing. We have conducted a laboratory experiment 
with 954 participants to test these hypotheses. While the results largely corroborate the 
theoretical predictions, we also ﬁnd that private information may be welfare-enhancing in 
the good state.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In the past three decades, the theory of contracts and incentives has been one of the most active ﬁelds of research 
in microeconomics.1 In this paper, we report about a large-scale laboratory experiment designed to test basic hypotheses 
of incentive theory. Speciﬁcally, we examine subjects’ behavior in a setting where a seller makes a contract offer to a 
buyer who has private information about his willingness-to-pay. This setting is often simply referred to as the canonical 
“adverse selection” problem and might be called the centerpiece of mechanism design theory.2 A fundamental hypothesis 
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1 For comprehensive textbook expositions of contract theory, see Laffont and Martimort (2002), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), and Salanié (2005).
2 While “adverse selection” originally referred to a potential consequence of asymmetric information, by now the term is usually used whenever a party 
has private information at the time the contract is written (while post-contractual information asymmetries, e.g. due to hidden actions, go under the 
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offering a suitable menu of contracts. In the second-best solution, high-valuation buyers then consume the same quantity 
or quality as in a setting with symmetric information, while there is a downward distortion in the case of low-valuation 
buyers. Our aim is to study whether these predictions are supported by the data and to assess the role that other-regarding 
preferences and decision errors might play in this context.
We consider the simplest possible adverse selection problem in which incentive theory predicts that the seller may want 
to separate buyer types by offering a menu of contracts. Speciﬁcally, suppose a seller can sell either good A or good B
to a buyer. In line with the traditional mechanism design approach, the seller has full commitment power and makes a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. For simplicity, assume the seller has no costs. The buyer is either a low type or a high 
type with equal probability. A low-type buyer’s valuation for a good is smaller than a high-type buyer’s valuation for the 
good. Moreover, regardless of his type, a buyer’s valuation for good A is always larger than his valuation for good B . Good 
B may thus be interpreted as a smaller quantity or quality of the same product.
Under standard assumptions of rationality and proﬁt-maximizing behavior, when there is symmetric information, then 
the parties will trade the eﬃcient good A and the seller will extract the total gains from trade. However, suppose now 
that the buyer has private information about his type. Depending on the parameter constellation, it can be optimal for the 
seller to offer a menu of contracts such that a high-type buyer will purchase good A, while a low-type buyer will purchase 
good B . In particular, if the low-type buyer’s valuation for good A is very small, the seller would have to set a very small 
price if she wanted to ensure trade of the eﬃcient good A regardless of the buyer’s type. It can then be more proﬁtable for 
the seller to trade only the ineﬃcient good B with a low-type buyer, which allows the seller to obtain a higher price for 
good A from a high-type buyer. Hence, the same good as under symmetric information is sold in the good state of nature 
(i.e., there is “no distortion at the top”), while in the bad state of nature only good B is sold (i.e., there is a downward 
distortion of the quantity or quality traded).
In our experimental study, we have conducted two private information treatments. In parameter constellation I, incentive 
theory predicts that the seller offers a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In parameter constellation II, the 
low-type buyer’s valuation for good A is suﬃciently large such that according to theory, the seller wants to trade good 
A with both buyer types. In addition, we have conducted two benchmark treatments which are similar to the two main 
treatments, except that there is symmetric information.
Results. Consider ﬁrst parameter constellation I. It turns out that when the buyers have private information, the vast 
majority of sellers indeed offer an incentive-compatible menu of contracts. As a result, high-valuation buyers typically buy 
good A, while buying good B is the most frequent decision of low-valuation buyers. Comparing the private information 
treatment to the benchmark treatment with symmetric information, we ﬁnd that total surplus levels do not differ in the 
good state of nature, while the total surplus levels are smaller under private information in the bad state of nature. Hence, 
the presence of private information is welfare-reducing. These results are all in good accord with the main hypotheses of 
adverse selection theory.
However, there are deviations. In particular, we observe that some offers are rejected and that the prices are on aver-
age smaller than predicted. These deviations occur already in the symmetric information benchmark treatments and are 
reminiscent of similar ﬁndings in the literature on ultimatum game experiments (see Güth et al., 1982).3
Next, consider parameter constellation II. Most sellers offer only good A, and also when a menu is offered buying good A
is the most frequent decision of the buyers, regardless of their type. As predicted, in the bad state of nature, the total surplus 
levels do not differ between the private information treatment and the corresponding benchmark treatment with symmetric 
information. However, in the good state of nature, the total surplus levels are larger under private information than under 
symmetric information. In contrast to standard theory, the presence of private information can thus be welfare-improving.
A closer look at the data reveals that the latter ﬁnding is due to the fact that standard theory is too optimistic about the 
eﬃciency attained under symmetric information. Once we take into account that buyers tend to reject offers that would 
give them only a very small payoff, the welfare-enhancing effect of private information is actually a consequence of the fact 
that sellers’ price-setting behavior is in line with adverse selection theory. In parameter constellation II, incentive theory 
predicts that under private information sellers set prices for good A that are small enough to make them acceptable for 
low-type buyers. In contrast, under symmetric information the sellers set larger prices when they know that the buyer has 
a high valuation. As a result, in the good state of nature there are less rejections when there is private information.
Across all four treatments, inspection of the data reveals that the vast majority of buyer decisions is compatible with 
standard preferences. However, other-regarding preferences might be useful to explain the observed deviations. We employ 
the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) approach developed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) to estimate structural mod-
els, taking into account that buyers may have other-regarding preferences. It turns out that other-regarding preferences are 
helpful to explain the data; however, they are on average less pronounced than is suggested in the literature on inequity 
design theory (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Ch. 7). See Nobel Prize Committee (2007) for an appraisal of mechanism design in celebration of the 
pioneering contributions by Hurwicz, Maskin, and Myerson.
3 Since Güth et al. (1982) conducted the ﬁrst experiment on the ultimatum game some thirty years ago, it has become one of the most prominent 
games in experimental economics. In the ultimatum game, a proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer regarding the division of a pie to a responder. If the 
responder rejects, both parties get zero. Very unequal divisions are often rejected, and on average proposers offer 30–40% of the pie. See Güth and Tietz
(1990), Güth (1995), and Camerer (2003) for surveys.
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particular buyer of a given type will react to a speciﬁc offer makes the sellers’ task more diﬃcult. To better understand 
the sellers’ behavior, we have conducted two additional control treatments in which the role of the buyer is played by 
the computer. The sellers know that the computer will respond to their offers as a proﬁt-maximizer. In both parameter 
constellations it turns out that the fraction of sellers who offer a menu of contracts does not differ between the computer 
treatment and the original private information treatment. However, the sellers set larger prices in the computer treatments, 
coming much closer to the theoretically predicted offers. We thus conclude that in the original private information treat-
ments a substantial amount of the deviations of the sellers’ behavior from the theoretical predictions cannot simply be 
attributed to decision errors. The sellers understand that the buyers will not always react as proﬁt-maximizers and adjust 
their offers accordingly.
Related literature. The theory of incentives is focused on the implications that the presence of private information has 
for the design of contracts. Empirical tests of incentive theory are thus impeded by an inherent data availability problem.4
Therefore, as has recently also been pointed out by Huck et al. (2011), controlled laboratory experiments can be particularly 
useful to directly test contract-theoretic models. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the ﬁrst direct experi-
mental test of a contract-theoretic model that captures the main features of the canonical adverse selection problem with 
private values as devised by Baron and Myerson (1982), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).5
In a previous study (Hoppe and Schmitz, 2013), we have conducted an experiment in a simpler setting in which a 
principal and an agent could either agree on the eﬃcient trade level or not trade at all. In this setting, it was not possible 
to distinguish between a distortion that is predicted by theory and a rejection that is in contrast to theory.6 Thus, the 
fundamental hypothesis of adverse selection theory that the principal may offer a menu of contracts to induce separation 
between agent types could not be tested in this simple setting. This is also the case in the earlier studies of pie-splitting 
games with private information.7
In a recent paper, Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) experimentally study a hidden information problem that was mo-
tivated by contract theory. However, these authors consider only the contract that according to standard theory would 
be optimal under symmetric information. They exogenously assume that the same contract is signed when there is hid-
den information and explore the effects of communication. Thus, their approach is orthogonal to contract theory, which 
studies how the design of contracts should be adapted when information asymmetries are introduced. In line with the 
contract-theoretic approach, in our experiment contracts are endogenously chosen and we study to what extent the pre-
dicted implications of private information on contracting are borne out by the data.
There are some experimental contributions that similar to our study allow subjects to offer menus of contracts in order 
to test screening models. However, these models are quite different from the canonical adverse selection problem. Posey 
and Yavas (2007) experimentally test the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of an insurance market. While the earlier 
work by Shapira and Venezia (1999) found no support for the hypothesis that sellers screen buyers in a one-shot setting, 
Posey and Yavas (2007) ﬁnd support for a separating equilibrium when subjects play the same game repeatedly. Kübler et 
al. (2008) test the Spence (1973) education game in experimental markets. They compare the original signaling model with 
a screening variant and ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more separating behavior in the signaling game. They also analyze the effect of 
increasing the number of competing employers from two to three, which leads to higher wages in the signaling game.8 Note 
that in contrast to these papers, we study the canonical adverse selection problem with bilateral contracting and private 
values.9 Also in contrast to these papers, in our experiment buyers could reject offers and we compare private information 
treatments with corresponding symmetric information treatments in order to investigate whether adverse selection theory 
captures the main effects that occur when private information is added to a contracting problem.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the 
theoretical framework that provides the starting point for our experimental study. We describe the experimental design in 
Section 3 and we derive predictions in Section 4. We present and analyze our experimental results in Section 5. Finally, 
concluding remarks follow in Section 6.
4 See Prendergast (1999) and Masten and Saussier (2000) for surveys of empirical work on contract theory.
5 These papers build on the pioneering work by Mirrlees (1971); see also the closely related work by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Goldman et al. (1984). 
The canonical adverse selection problem has become a cornerstone of contract theory, see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Ch. 7), Laffont and Martimort 
(2002, Ch. 2), or Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Ch. 2). These books also survey numerous applications in areas such as monopolistic price-discrimination, 
public procurement, or regulation of natural monopolies (see also Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
6 The focus of the experiment in Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) was on endogenous information acquisition in the spirit of Crémer and Khalil (1992), Lewis 
and Sappington (1997), and Kessler (1998).
7 In the pie-splitting experiments studied by Forsythe et al. (1991), Kagel et al. (1996), and Harstad and Nagel (2004) the responder may have private 
information about the size of the pie. See also Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993), Straub and Murnighan (1995), Croson (1996), Güth et al. (1996), Rapoport 
and Sundali (1996), Güth and Huck (1997), Güth and Van Damme (1998), and Huck (1999) for variants of the ultimatum game in which the proposer has 
private information about the size of the pie.
8 See also Asparouhova (2006) and Cabrales et al. (2011) for further experimental studies on the effects of competition in different variants of adverse 
selection models.
9 Hence, in our setting the buyer’s type does not directly enter the seller’s payoff function. In contrast, in insurance markets or job markets, the sellers’ 
or employers’ proﬁts directly depend on the buyers’ or employees’ types. On private vs. common values in adverse selection models, see Jullien (2000).
20 E.I. Hoppe, P.W. Schmitz / Games and Economic Behavior 89 (2015) 17–332. The theoretical framework
In this section, we develop the simplest conceivable model that captures the main features of the basic adverse selection 
problem with private values. Consider a seller and a buyer, both of whom are risk-neutral. At an initial date 0, nature draws 
the buyer’s type θ ∈ {H, L}, where prob{θ = H} = π .
The parties can trade a single indivisible unit of either good A or good B . The two goods can be interpreted as two 
different quantities or qualities of the same product. The buyer’s valuation of good A is given by vθA , while his valuation of 
good B is given by vθB , where 0 < v
L
A < v
H
A and 0 < v
L
B < v
H
B . Let v
θ
B < v
θ
A for both types θ ∈ {H, L}. Thus, good B represents 
a smaller quantity or lower quality of the product that can be traded. We assume that the Spence–Mirrlees single-crossing 
condition vHA − vHB ≥ vLA − vLB holds; i.e., the additional utility from consuming a larger quantity or better quality is larger 
for a high-type buyer than for a low-type buyer. Moreover, we assume that vLB > π v
H
B , which ensures that the seller will 
never completely exclude the low-type buyer from trade. For simplicity, let us suppose that the seller does not have any 
costs. The reservation utilities of both parties are zero. Note that in a ﬁrst-best world, the parties would always agree to 
trade good A, regardless of the buyer’s type.
At date 1, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave it offer to the buyer. She can offer only good A at price pA , or only good B
at price pB , or she offers a menu (pA, pB). If the seller offers only one good, at date 2 the buyer can decide whether or not 
to buy the good at the stated price. If the seller offers a menu, then at date 2 the buyer can decide whether to buy good A
or good B or no good.
Each party maximizes its (expected) payoff. If a party’s proﬁt-maximizing decision is not unique, then it chooses the one 
that is in the interest of the other party. All parameters of the model are common knowledge, with the possible exception 
of the buyer’s type θ . Speciﬁcally, let us consider two different scenarios.
In the benchmark scenario, there is symmetric information; i.e., the seller knows the realization of the buyer’s type θ
when she offers a contract. In this case, the parties’ equilibrium behavior is straightforward and summarized in the following 
proposition.
Proposition 1. In the case of symmetric information, good A will be traded regardless of the buyer’s type. The seller offers only good A
and sets pA = vθA (equivalently, she may offer a menu with pA = vθA and pB ≥ vθB ). The seller’s proﬁt is vθA and the buyer’s proﬁt is 0.
Hence, when there is symmetric information, the ﬁrst-best outcome is achieved and the seller can extract the total 
surplus.
In the adverse selection scenario, the buyer has private information about his type; i.e., the seller does not know the 
realization of θ . In this case, equilibrium behavior depends on the parameter constellation.
Proposition 2. Consider the case of private information.
(i) Suppose vLA < v
L
B + π(vHA − vHB ). Then good A will be traded if θ = H, while good B will be traded if θ = L. The seller offers 
a menu with pA = vHA − (vHB − vLB) and pB = vLB . The seller’s expected proﬁt is π(vHA − (vHB − vLB)) + (1 − π)vLB and the buyer’s 
expected proﬁt is π(vHB − vLB).
(ii) Suppose vLA ≥ vLB +π(vHA − vHB ). Then good A will be traded regardless of the buyer’s type θ . The seller offers only good A and 
sets pA = vLA (equivalently, she may offer a menu with pA = vLA and pB ≥ vLB ). The seller’s proﬁt is vLA and the buyer’s expected proﬁt 
is π(vHA − vLA).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
When the buyer has private information, the ﬁrst-best solution will be achieved only if vLA is suﬃciently large (case ii). 
To give the buyer an incentive to buy good A regardless of his type, the seller sets pA = vLA , which implies that the 
high-valuation buyer gets a rent vHA − vLA .
Yet, if vLA is suﬃciently small (case i), then the high-valuation buyer’s rent would become very large, so the seller 
prefers to offer a menu which does not lead to the ﬁrst-best outcome if the buyer has a low valuation. Speciﬁcally, the 
seller sets pB = vLB , such that the low-valuation buyer will buy good B . To give the high-valuation buyer an incentive to buy 
good A, his rent when he buys good A must be at least vHB − vLB (i.e., his rent if he bought good B). Hence, the seller sets 
pA = vHA − (vHB − vLB). Thus, there is a downward distortion in the quantity or quality traded if the buyer’s valuation is low, 
while there is no distortion away from the ﬁrst-best outcome if the buyer’s valuation is high (i.e., there is “no distortion at 
the top”).
3. Experimental design
Our experiment consists of six treatments. In four treatments, half of the participants in each session were randomly 
assigned to the role of sellers and the others to the role of buyers. Each of these treatments was run in six to seven 
sessions; each session had between 24 and 32 participants. In addition, there were two treatments in which the role of the 
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The proﬁts in parameter constellation I.
Buyer’s proﬁt (high type) Buyer’s proﬁt (low type) Seller’s proﬁt
Buyer buys good A 100− pA 40− pA pA
Buyer buys good B 40− pB 30− pB pB
Buyer rejects 0 0 0
Table 2
The proﬁts in parameter constellation II.
Buyer’s proﬁt (high type) Buyer’s proﬁt (low type) Seller’s proﬁt
Buyer buys good A 100− pA 70− pA pA
Buyer buys good B 40− pB 30− pB pB
Buyer rejects 0 0 0
buyers was played by the computer, so that all participants were in the role of sellers. Each of these two treatments was 
run in three sessions with 28 to 32 participants.
No subject was allowed to participate in more than one session. In total, 954 subjects participated in the experiment. 
All subjects were students of the University of Cologne from a wide variety of ﬁelds of study.10 All interactions were 
anonymous; i.e., no subject knew the identity of its trading partner.
In order to ensure a large number of independent observations, each session consisted of only one round; i.e., there were 
no repetitions and this was known to the subjects.11 At the beginning of each session, written instructions were handed 
out to each subject.12 We made use of the experimental currency unit ECU. At the end of each session, the players’ payoffs 
were converted into euros (1 ECU = 0.12 €).13 A session lasted around 30 minutes. The minimum, median, maximum, and 
average proﬁts made in the experiment are 0, 3.60, 12, and 4.23 euros, respectively.
Our two main treatments PI-I and PI-II are designed to explore whether the sellers will indeed offer menus of contracts 
to induce separation whenever they should do so according to adverse selection theory.
Private information treatment PI-I. Each seller is randomly matched with one buyer. There are two goods A and B . A buyer 
and a seller can trade at most one of these goods. Half of the buyers have high valuations (vHA = 100 and vHB = 40), while 
the other half of the buyers have low valuations (vLA = 40 and vLB = 30).
There are two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the seller decides whether to offer only good A, or only good B , or a menu 
with both goods. If the seller decides to offer only good A, she chooses a price pA . If she decides to offer only good B , she 
chooses a price pB . If she offers a menu with both goods, she chooses prices pA and pB . The prices can be any integer 
between 0 and 100. The seller does not know the buyer’s type; all she knows is that it can be either high or low with equal 
probability (π = 1/2).
In the second stage, the buyer learns his type and then he makes his buying decision. If the seller has offered only one 
good, the buyer can either buy the good at the stated price or reject the offer. If the seller has offered a menu, the buyer 
can either buy good A at price pA , or buy good B at price pB , or reject the offer. The resulting proﬁts are displayed in 
Table 1.
Private information treatment PI-II. This treatment is identical to the PI-I treatment, except that now vLA = 70. The proﬁts are 
displayed in Table 2.
It is well-known from numerous experiments on the ultimatum game that responders tend to reject offers that would 
give a very large fraction of the pie to the proposer, and that in anticipation of such a rejection behavior proposers make 
relatively generous offers. For this reason, we conduct two benchmark treatments in which there is symmetric information. 
We can then compare our main treatments with the benchmark treatments in order to isolate the effects that the presence 
of private information has on contracting, which are the focus of the present paper.
Symmetric information treatment SI-I. This treatment is identical to the PI-I treatment, except that the seller knows the buyer’s 
type when she makes her offer.
Symmetric information treatment SI-II. This treatment is identical to the PI-II treatment, except that the seller knows the 
buyer’s type when she makes her offer.
10 The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004).
11 Note that in the context of ultimatum game experiments, Hoffman et al. (1994) have pointed out that using several rounds may inadvertently trigger 
repeated game effects even when a random matching protocol is employed. However, in future research it may also be interesting to conduct experiments 
explicitly focused on learning in adverse selection frameworks.
12 The instructions for all treatments are in the Supplementary Material.
13 In addition to the proﬁts made in the experiment, subjects in the four treatments with human buyers were paid a participation fee of 70 ECU, which 
ensured total payoffs to be non-negative.
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the sellers would offer the theoretically optimal contracts if they knew for sure that the buyers would respond as standard 
theory predicts, we have conducted two additional control treatments. In these treatments, the buyer’s role is taken on by 
the computer.14
Private information computer treatment PIC-I. This treatment constitutes a one-person decision problem. The ﬁrst stage is 
identical to the ﬁrst stage in the PI-I treatment, except that the seller knows that the role of the buyer will be played by 
the computer. The seller knows that in the second stage the computer will make his buying decision in order to maximize 
his proﬁt (and that in case of indifference the computer will make the decision that is better for the seller).
Private information computer treatment PIC-II. This treatment is identical to the PIC-I treatment, except that now vLA = 70.
4. Predictions
Our primary interest is to explore how subjects behave in the private information treatment PI-I. According to Proposi-
tion 2(i), the seller induces separation of the buyer types by offering a menu with pA = 90 and pB = 30, such that good A
is bought by a high-type buyer and good B is bought by a low-type buyer. Hence, the ﬁrst-best solution is achieved if the 
buyer is of the high type (i.e., there is “no distortion at the top”), while the ineﬃcient good B is traded if the buyer is of 
the low type (i.e., there is a “downward distortion” in the bad state of nature). Intuitively, as the low valuation for good A is 
relatively small, it is not proﬁtable for the seller to set pA so small that the buyer purchases good A regardless of his type. 
Thus, the seller is better off if she sells good B to the low-type buyer. The maximum price that a low-type buyer is willing 
to pay for good B is pB = 30. Note that given this price, a high-type buyer would make a proﬁt of 10 if he bought good B . 
As a consequence, the maximum price the seller will set for good A is pA = 90, because otherwise a high-type buyer would 
buy good B .
Recall that the outcome predicted by standard contract theory assumes that it is common knowledge that all parties 
behave in a rational and proﬁt-maximizing way. While in the light of previous experimental results we do not expect that 
the subjects’ behavior will strictly adhere to these assumptions, we hypothesize that most sellers will indeed offer menus 
that induce most high-type buyers to buy the eﬃcient good A and most low-type buyers to buy the ineﬃcient good B .
According to our theoretical framework, the sellers will try to separate the buyers only if the low valuation for good A
is relatively small. It is thus instructive to compare treatment PI-I with treatment PI-II. In the private information treatment 
PI-II, according to Proposition 2(ii), the seller offers only good A at the price pA = 70 (equivalently, she could offer a menu 
with pA = 70 and pB ≥ 30). Thus, the ﬁrst-best outcome is always attained; i.e., the buyer buys good A regardless of his 
type. Intuitively, since in parameter constellation II the low valuation for good A is relatively large, it is proﬁt-maximizing 
for the seller to set pA small enough such that both buyer types are willing to buy good A.
While we expect deviations from the standard theory predictions, we hypothesize that indeed sellers will typically not 
try to separate buyers in the treatment PI-II, so that in most cases the eﬃcient good A will be traded, regardless of whether 
the buyer’s valuation is low or high.
The vast literature on ultimatum games has shown that subjects’ behavior deviates from standard theory already when 
the size of the pie to be divided is commonly known. In order to properly assess whether the introduction of private 
information has the effects predicted by adverse selection theory, it is thus useful to compare the main treatments with 
the benchmark treatments that are identical to PI-I and PI-II except that there is symmetric information. In the symmetric 
information treatment SI-I, according to Proposition 1, the seller offers pA = 100 if the buyer is of the high type, and she 
offers pA = 40 if the buyer is of the low type. (Equivalently, she could offer menus with pA = 100, pB ≥ 40 and pA = 40, 
pB ≥ 30, respectively.) In the symmetric information treatment SI-II, according to Proposition 1, the seller offers pA = 100 if 
the buyer is of the high type, and she offers pA = 70 if the buyer is of the low type. (Equivalently, she could offer menus 
with pA = 100, pB ≥ 40 and pA = 70, pB ≥ 30, respectively.) Standard theory predicts that in the symmetric information 
treatments the ﬁrst-best solution will always be attained; i.e., good A will be traded regardless of the buyer’s type.
We hypothesize that indeed in the symmetric information treatments the eﬃcient good A will be traded in most cases. 
In particular, we hypothesize that in PI-I the total surplus will be smaller than in SI-I in the case of low-type buyers (since 
private information implies a “downward distortion” in the bad state), while there will be no difference in the case of 
high-type buyers (since private information implies “no distortion at the top”). Finally, we hypothesize that the total surplus 
levels do not differ between PI-II and SI-II, regardless of the buyer’s type.
5. Results
5.1. Overview
This section summarizes our central results. Tables 3 and 5 show descriptive statistics of our two main treatments 
in which the buyers have private information, while Tables 4 and 6 present descriptive statistics of the corresponding 
benchmark treatments with symmetric information.
14 On the use of computer treatments, see also the experimental studies by Houser and Kurzban (2002) and Huck et al. (2011).
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Private information treatment PI-I. The stars indicate whether there are signiﬁcant differences (* at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level) between the high and 
the low types.
Menu Only A Only B Total
# Obs. (Share) 74 (71.2%) 28 (26.9%) 2 (1.9%) 104
Mean pA 58.41 54.79 57.41
Mean pB 23.28 30.00 23.46
High type:
Buy A 28/35 (80.0%) 14/16 (87.5%) 42/52 (80.8%)
Buy B 7/35 (20.0%) 1/1 8/52 (15.4%)
Reject 0/35 (0.0%) 2/16 (12.5%) 0/1 2/52 (3.9%)
Mean proﬁt seller 48.74 45.81 30.00 47.48
Mean proﬁt buyer 39.26 41.69 10.00 39.44
Mean total surplus 88.00 87.50 40.00 86.92
Low type:
Buy A 3/39 (7.7%)** 3/12 (25.0%)** 6/52 (11.5%)**
Buy B 25/39 (64.1%)** 0/1 25/52 (48.1%)**
Reject 11/39 (28.2%)** 9/12 (75.0%)** 1/1 21/52 (40.4%)**
Mean proﬁt seller 15.10** 8.25** 0.00 13.23**
Mean proﬁt buyer 7.21** 1.75** 0.00 5.81**
Mean total surplus 22.31** 10.00** 0.00 19.04**
Table 4
Symmetric information treatment SI-I. The stars indicate whether there are signiﬁcant differences (* at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level) between the high 
and the low types.
Menu Only A Total
High type:
# Obs. (Share) 19 (40.4%) 28 (59.6%) 47
Mean pA 67.00 70.18 68.89
Mean pB 26.53 26.53
Buy A 16/19 (84.2%) 23/28 (82.1%) 39/47 (83.0%)
Buy B 2/19 (10.5%) 2/47 (4.3%)
Reject 1/19 (5.3%) 5/28 (17.9%) 6/47 (12.8%)
Mean proﬁt seller 56.47 54.00 55.00
Mean proﬁt buyer 31.95 28.14 29.68
Mean total surplus 88.42 82.14 84.68
Low type:
# Obs. (Share) 17 (36.2%) 30 (63.8%) 47
Mean pA 28.18** 29.53** 29.04**
Mean pB 25.29 25.29
Buy A 8/17 (47.1%)* 22/30 (73.3%) 30/47 (63.8%)
Buy B 4/17 (23.5%) 4/47 (8.5%)
Reject 5/17 (29.4%) 8/30 (26.7%) 13/47 (27.7%)
Mean proﬁt seller 16.59** 18.70** 17.94**
Mean proﬁt buyer 9.29** 10.63** 10.15**
Mean total surplus 25.88** 29.33** 28.09**
Consider ﬁrst Table 3, which shows the outcomes of the private information treatment PI-I. As predicted, the vast ma-
jority of sellers offered a menu. In these cases, high-valuation buyers typically bought good A, while almost two-thirds of 
the low-type buyers bought good B . As indicated in Table 3, the buying decisions differ signiﬁcantly between the high- and 
low-valuation buyers.15 Even if we take into consideration that about one out of four sellers offered only good A, buying 
good B was the most frequent decision among all low-valuation buyers.
At ﬁrst sight, the total rejection rate of around 40% in the case of low-type buyers appears to be relatively large. However, 
note that if a menu is offered, then the rejection rate is only around 28%, which is not different from the rejection rate of 
low-type buyers when there is symmetric information (see Table 4). The fact that in PI-I there is a large rejection rate of 
low-type buyers when only good A is offered is not surprising, since given that only good A is offered, standard theory 
would predict an offer of pA = 100, which would be accepted by high types only.
In line with our predictions, in PI-II and in the symmetric information treatments the vast majority of buyers bought 
good A, regardless of the buyer’s type. Indeed, in each of these three treatments most sellers offered only good A.
Consider the symmetric information treatment SI-I (see Table 4). Regardless of whether the seller is matched with a 
low-type or a high-type buyer, the share of sellers who offer a menu is signiﬁcantly smaller than in PI-I (p-values ≤ 0.001). 
Moreover, even when a menu was offered, buying good A was the most frequent decision, regardless of the buyer’s type.
15 Throughout, we use two-tailed Mann–Whitney U tests in the case of prices, proﬁts, and surplus levels, while we use two-tailed Fisher exact tests in 
the case of categorical data.
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Private information treatment PI-II. The stars indicate whether there are signiﬁcant differences (* at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level) between the high and 
the low types.
Menu Only A Only B Total
# Obs. (Share) 34 (37.0%) 56 (60.9%) 2 (2.2%) 92
Mean pA 59.74 54.89 56.72
Mean pB 28.97 27.50 28.89
High type:
Buy A 17/18 (94.4%) 26/28 (92.9%) 43/46 (93.5%)
Buy B 0/18 (0.0%) 0/46 (0.0%)
Reject 1/18 (5.6%) 2/28 (7.1%) 3/46 (6.5%)
Mean proﬁt seller 53.11 48.89 50.54
Mean proﬁt buyer 41.33 43.96 42.93
Mean total surplus 94.44 92.86 93.48
Low type:
Buy A 10/16 (62.5%)* 22/28 (78.6%) 32/46 (69.6%)**
Buy B 1/16 (6.3%) 1/2 2/46 (4.4%)
Reject 5/16 (31.3%) 6/28 (21.4%) 1/2 12/46 (26.1%)*
Mean proﬁt seller 35.94 42.61 12.50 38.98
Mean proﬁt buyer 9.69** 12.39** 2.50 11.02**
Mean total surplus 45.63** 55.00** 15.00 50.00**
Table 6
Symmetric information treatment SI-II. The stars indicate whether there are signiﬁcant differences (* at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level) between the high 
and the low types.
Menu Only A Total
High type:
# Obs. (Share) 14 (29.8%) 33 (70.2%) 47
Mean pA 69.64 67.76 68.32
Mean pB 37.57 37.57
Buy A 12/14 (85.7%) 25/33 (75.8%) 37/47 (78.7%)
Buy B 0/14 (0.0%) 0/47 (0.0%)
Reject 2/14 (14.3%) 8/33 (24.2%) 10/47 (21.3%)
Mean proﬁt seller 56.07 47.94 50.36
Mean proﬁt buyer 29.64 27.82 28.36
Mean total surplus 85.71 75.76 78.72
Low type:
# Obs. (Share) 9 (19.2%) 38 (80.9%) 47
Mean pA 45.44** 53.11** 51.64**
Mean pB 30.33 30.33
Buy A 6/9 (66.7%) 30/38 (78.9%) 36/47 (76.6%)
Buy B 0/9 (0.0%) 0/47 (0.0%)
Reject 3/9 (33.3%) 8/38 (21.1%) 11/47 (23.4%)
Mean proﬁt seller 24.44** 39.32* 36.47**
Mean proﬁt buyer 22.22 15.95** 17.15**
Mean total surplus 46.67** 55.26** 53.62**
Similarly, in parameter constellation II (see Tables 5 and 6) the share of sellers who offer a menu is signiﬁcantly smaller 
than in the PI-I treatment (p-values < 0.001). Even if a menu is offered, buying good A is always the most frequent decision.
So far, the main outcomes of the experiment are in good accord with the qualitative predictions of adverse selection 
theory. Yet, there are deviations. In all four treatments, we observe rejections, which should not occur according to standard 
theory. Moreover, on average the prices are smaller than predicted. As a consequence, the sellers are typically worse off and 
the buyers are better off compared to the theoretical benchmark. These deviations are reminiscent of experimental ﬁndings 
in the literature on ultimatum games. Since our goal is to explore whether incentive theory captures the main effects 
that occur when private information is added to a contracting problem, it is crucial to compare our private information 
treatments with the corresponding symmetric information treatments (which closely resemble standard ultimatum games).
When we compare the PI-I treatment with the relevant benchmark SI-I, we ﬁnd strong support for the “no distortion at 
the top” prediction of adverse selection theory: The total surplus levels in case of high-type buyers do not differ signiﬁcantly 
between PI-I and SI-I (p-value = 0.958). Furthermore, in line with the predicted distortion in the bad state of the world, in 
the case of low-type buyers the total surplus level in PI-I is signiﬁcantly smaller than in SI-I (p-value < 0.001). Overall, as 
predicted, the impact of private information in parameter constellation I is thus to reduce the expected total surplus.
Now consider parameter constellation II. According to adverse selection theory, the total surplus levels should not differ 
between the private information and the symmetric information scenarios. Indeed, there is no signiﬁcant difference in the 
case of low-type buyers (p-value = 0.517). Yet, we ﬁnd that the surplus level in the case of high-type buyers in PI-II is 
signiﬁcantly larger than in SI-II (p-value = 0.041). Hence, in parameter constellation II, the presence of private information 
surprisingly improves the total surplus, which could never happen under standard theory.
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To better understand the decisions made by the subjects that have led to these results, we will analyze the data in more 
detail in the following section.
5.2. A closer look at the data
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of the sellers’ offers in the private information treatments. In each treatment, the size of a 
circle is proportional to the relative frequency with which the respective offer was made.16
First, consider the treatment PI-I, which is displayed in the left panel of Fig. 1. Recall that 74 sellers offered a menu. 
Their offers (pA, pB) are shown in the lower part of the PI-I panel. The offers pA of the 28 sellers who offered good A only 
are shown in the upper part of the panel. The most frequently observed offer was a menu with pA = 70, pB = 20; this offer 
was made by 8 sellers.17
In parameter constellation I, according to standard theory low-type buyers never buy good A if pA is larger than 40, 
and they never buy good B if pB is larger than 30. These critical prices are illustrated in the PI-I panel by the vertical and 
horizontal black lines, respectively. Moreover, when a menu is offered, a low-type buyer prefers good B to good A whenever 
the incentive compatibility constraint 30 − pB ≥ 40 − pA is satisﬁed; i.e. if the offer lies on the right-hand side of the 
curve pB = pA − 10. For a high-type buyer, purchasing good A is always more attractive than rejecting an offer pA ≤ 100. 
When a menu is offered, a high-type buyer prefers good A to good B whenever the incentive compatibility constraint 
100 − pA ≥ 40 − pB is satisﬁed, which is the case for offers that lie on the left-hand side of the curve pB = pA − 60.
Observe that according to standard theory, menu offers with pB ≤ 30 that satisfy both incentive compatibility constraints 
induce high-type buyers to buy good A and low-type buyers to buy good B . As is illustrated in Fig. 1, 66 of the 74 menu 
offers (89.2%) lie in this region. Thus, a fundamental prediction of adverse selection theory is corroborated by our data. The 
sellers offer menus in order to separate the buyers depending on their types.
Next, consider the treatment PI-II, which is displayed in the right panel of Fig. 1. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, the most 
frequently observed decision of the sellers was to offer only good A at the price pA = 50; this offer was made 14 times.18
In parameter constellation II, according to standard theory low-type buyers do not buy good A if pA is larger than 70, and 
they do not buy good B if pB is larger than 30. When a menu is offered, low-type buyers prefer good A to good B whenever 
the incentive compatibility constraint 70 − pA ≥ 30 − pB is satisﬁed (which is the case if the offer lies on the left-hand side 
of the curve pB = pA − 40). When a menu is offered to a high type, he prefers good A to good B if 100 − pA ≥ 40 − pB , 
which holds for offers that lie left of the curve pB = pA − 60. In total, 82 of the 92 offers (89.1%) were such that a buyer 
should have bought good A regardless of his type. Thus, a comparison between PI-I and PI-II shows that in line with adverse 
selection theory, the sellers try to separate the buyers only if the low-type buyers’ valuation for good A is suﬃciently small.
16 In each of the two private information treatments, there were two sellers who offered good B only. These offers are not depicted in the ﬁgures.
17 The other offers that were made by at least ﬁve sellers were menus with pA = 60, pB = 20 (7 times), pA = 50, pB = 20 (7 times), and pA = 80, pB = 25
(5 times).
18 The other offers that were made by at least ﬁve sellers were pA = 60 (11 times) and pA = 65 (5 times).
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Let us now examine the buyers’ responses to the offers made by the sellers. Fig. 2 shows the buyers’ behavior in 
treatments PI-I and PI-II. The left (right) panels depict all offers received by low-type (high-type) buyers and their responses. 
As explained above, the black lines divide the offer space into different regions, depending on whether according to standard 
theory a low-type (high-type) buyer would buy good A, good B , or reject the offer (R). For the moment, ignore the orange 
lines and letters.
The ﬁgure clearly shows that while there were some deviations (typically close to the borders between the regions), by 
far most buyer decisions were as expected; i.e., most buyers bought good A (B) when the offer was in region “A” (“B”), 
while most offers in region “R” were rejected.
Next, let us investigate the sellers’ and buyers’ behavior in the benchmark treatments with symmetric information. In 
these treatments, each seller knows whether she is matched with a high-type or a low-type buyer. Fig. 3 shows the sellers’ 
offers and the buyers’ responses, depending on the buyers’ type. Observe that regardless of the parameter constellation 
and regardless of the buyers’ type, almost all sellers make offers such that according to standard theory buyers should buy 
good A. Indeed, the vast majority of the buyers responded as predicted, although there were some deviations.
E.I. Hoppe, P.W. Schmitz / Games and Economic Behavior 89 (2015) 17–33 27Fig. 3. The sellers’ offers and the buyers’ reactions in the treatments SI-I and SI-II, depending on the buyers’ type. The size of the symbols is proportional 
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When we compare the upper left panels of Figs. 2 and 3, which depict the offers received by low-valuation buyers in 
PI-I and SI-I, it becomes evident that in PI-I much more offers induced the buyers to purchase the ineﬃcient good B . As 
can be seen in the upper right panels of Figs. 2 and 3, the vast majority of high-valuation buyers bought good A, regardless 
of whether or not there was private information. From an ex ante point of view, we ﬁnd that in line with adverse selection 
theory private information reduces eﬃciency in parameter constellation I.
Now let us examine parameter constellation II. As can be seen in the lower left panels of Figs. 2 and 3, behavior did 
not differ much between PI-II and SI-II when the buyers had low valuations. However, compare now the lower right panels, 
which show the offers received by high-type buyers in PI-II and SI-II. Observe that in PI-II, only 3 out of the 46 sellers (i.e., 
less than 7%) chose a price pA strictly larger than 70. In line with adverse selection theory, in parameter constellation II 
the sellers wanted to trade good A with both types of buyers. Since in PI-II the seller did not know the buyer’s type, she 
did not set pA larger than 70 if she wanted to trade good A regardless of the buyer’s type. In contrast, when in SI-II the 
sellers knew that the buyers’ valuation for good A was 100, then 18 out of 47 sellers (i.e., more than 38%) chose a price 
pA strictly larger than 70. Yet, several of these offers were rejected, whereas in PI-II there were fewer offers with pA > 70
and thus there were fewer rejections. This explains why overall the introduction of private information enhances eﬃciency 
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information, so there would be no scope for an eﬃciency increase due to private information).
Taken together, standard theory is too optimistic about the eﬃciency achieved in the symmetric information benchmark, 
since it neglects the fact that offers that give buyers only a very small fraction of the surplus tend to be rejected. Once 
we take into account such rejection behavior, the conclusions of adverse selection theory about the sellers’ behavior when 
buyers have private information are corroborated by the data. In particular, in parameter constellation I most sellers offer 
menus to induce separation, while in parameter constellation II the sellers want to trade good A with both buyer types.
5.3. Analyzing the deviations
In this section, we analyze the quantitative deviations of the data from the theoretical predictions more deeply. In the 
literature on ultimatum games, it has often been argued that rejections of offers that give responders only a small fraction 
of the pie can be explained by other-regarding preferences. In our framework, maybe the simplest formalization of such 
preferences is to assume that a buyer of type θ ∈ {H, L} has the utility vθG − pG − αmax{pG − (vθG − pG), 0} if he buys 
good G ∈ {A, B}, and he has the utility zero if he buys no good. In other words, if in the case of a purchase the buyer’s 
material payoff vθG − pG is larger than the seller’s material payoff pG , then the buyer’s utility is equal to his material payoff. 
Otherwise, the buyer experiences a loss of α times the difference between the seller’s and his own material payoff. The 
parameter α ≥ 0 measures the strength of the buyer’s inequity aversion. The linear formalization is in the spirit of Fehr and 
Schmidt’s (1999) prominent work on other-regarding preferences.19
It is straightforward to see that an inequity-averse buyer will prefer buying good G at price pG to a rejection whenever 
pG ≤ vθG(1 +α)/(1 +2α). Thus, while a buyer with standard preferences would be willing to buy good G whenever pG ≤ vθG , 
a suﬃciently inequity-averse buyer may prefer to reject an offer pG ∈ (vθG/2, vθG ]. Analogously, an inequity averse-buyer may 
purchase the ineﬃcient good B even when vθA − pA ≥ vθB − pB holds.
In order to estimate the parameter α, we must somehow account for noise in the data. One possibility to do so is the 
logit-QRE approach pioneered by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Speciﬁcally, let Uik denote player i’s expected utility if he 
makes a decision k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then the probability that he chooses the decision k = kˆ is given by
prob{k = kˆ} = e
λUikˆ
∑n
k=1 eλUik
.
Hence, the probability of a decision error decreases with the utility loss that is caused by the error. When computing his 
expected utility, a player takes into account that all decisions (including his own future decisions) are made in this stochastic 
way (we thus apply the agent-QRE concept developed by McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998). The parameter λ can be interpreted 
as a rationality parameter. Behavior is completely random if λ = 0, while behavior approaches rational choice when λ
increases. We use maximum likelihood to estimate the model parameters. Following Rogers et al. (2009), we provide two 
benchmarks. The “random” log likelihood is a lower bound for the quality of ﬁt; it results from a model where all decisions 
are randomly taken. The “empirical” log likelihood is the best possible ﬁt to the aggregate data; it results from a hindsight 
model that assigns to each decision its empirical relative frequency.
Table 7 shows the results of the QRE estimations.20 In the ﬁrst row, we assume standard preferences, while in the 
second row, we allow each buyer to be inequity-averse with parameter α.21 Note that in the latter case it turns out that 
in every treatment the parameter α is signiﬁcantly different from zero and the quality of ﬁt is better than in the case of 
standard preferences. Yet, consistent among all four treatments we ﬁnd that the quality of ﬁt improves only modestly and 
the inequity aversion parameter is rather small, α ≈ 0.1.22
In the four treatments, altogether 384 buyer decisions had to be made. Only 57 decisions could not be explained by 
standard preferences; i.e., 85.2% of the decisions were compatible with standard theory. The regions in which good A, 
good B , or no good would be bought by an inequity-averse buyer with α = 0.1 are delineated in Figs. 2 and 3 by the 
orange curves (and they are labeled with the orange letters “A”, “B”, and “R”). Overall, 86.7% of the buyer decisions can be 
explained by inequity aversion with the parameter α = 0.1, which is only slightly better than standard theory.23
The buyers’ behavior typically deviated from standard predictions only relatively close to the borders between the regions 
in which good A, good B , or no good should be bought according to standard theory. This means that the utility loss 
19 See also the literature survey by Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a discussion of related formalizations of other-regarding preferences.
20 In the QRE estimations, we have grouped the prices into 21 categories (speciﬁcally, category 0 contains prices weakly smaller than 2, categories 
p˜ ∈ {5, 10, 15, . . . , 95} contain prices from p˜ − 2 to p˜ + 2, and category 100 contains prices weakly larger than 98).
21 We have also estimated models with different rationality parameters λB and λS for the buyers and sellers, respectively. The additional parameter 
improves the quality of ﬁt only slightly and in all four treatments we still ﬁnd α ≈ 0.1.
22 Based on their inspection of ultimatum game data, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest an average α of 0.85 (without employing a formal estimation 
technique). Speciﬁcally, they propose a distribution of inequity aversion parameters also capturing aversion towards advantageous inequity. We have also 
estimated a QRE model assuming their distribution of parameters. In all four treatments, the quality of ﬁt turns out to be lower than under the assumption 
of standard preferences.
23 As can be seen in Figs. 2 and 3, while some buyer decisions that are incompatible with standard theory can be explained if we allow for inequity 
aversion, there are also cases in which the opposite is true.
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QRE estimations with standard preferences and with inequity aversion. (Standard errors are in parentheses.)
PI-I PI-II SI-I SI-II
Standard preferences λ = 0.162 (0.011) 
ln L = −611.4
λ = 0.128 (0.011) 
ln L = −431.5
λ = 0.117 (0.008) 
ln L = −466.7
λ = 0.090 (0.006) 
ln L = −415.8
Inequity aversion α = 0.100 (0.026) 
λ = 0.162 (0.011) 
ln L = −601.1
α = 0.116 (0.025) 
λ = 0.135 (0.011) 
ln L = −417.3
α = 0.095 (0.024) 
λ = 0.122 (0.008) 
ln L = −457.1
α = 0.090 (0.026) 
λ = 0.093 (0.006) 
ln L = −409.1
Random ln L = −758.3 ln L = −562.2 ln L = −578.8 ln L = −534.0
Empirical ln L = −357.2 ln L = −297.5 ln L = −340.9 ln L = −325.0
associated with these deviations was rather small, so they can well be explained by QRE even in the absence of inequity 
aversion.24 Therefore, the QRE approach might somewhat underestimate the parameter α.
However, even without resorting to QRE estimations, there is evidence that other-regarding preferences are not very 
pronounced in our experiment. In particular, we ﬁnd that the fraction of buyer decisions that can be explained by inequity 
aversion is maximal for α = 0.2; in this case, 87.5% of the decisions can be explained.25
Of course, if we allowed each buyer to have a different parameter α, inequity aversion could explain more buyer deci-
sions. In the QRE estimation, the parameter λ captures both noise and heterogeneity among players.26 Overall, our analysis 
shows that while other-regarding preferences can be helpful to explain the buyers’ behavior, on average these preferences 
are not as strong as suggested by the literature on inequity aversion in the context of ultimatum games.27 Yet, buyers may 
have different inequity aversion parameters and they may make mistakes, so there is uncertainty about how a speciﬁc buyer 
of a given type will react to a particular offer, which makes the sellers’ task more diﬃcult.
In view of this analysis, it is not surprising that the sellers’ offers are somewhat dispersed. Given that buyers may be 
inequity-averse, it makes sense for the sellers to offer smaller prices than predicted by standard theory. Given that a buyer’s 
behavior is uncertain, different sellers may form different beliefs about what is the optimal price offer. However, it might 
also be the case that the sellers are simply not able to ﬁnd the optimal contract, even if they knew for sure that buyers 
responded according to standard theory.
To shed more light on the sellers’ behavior, we have conducted two control treatments which were similar to PI-I and 
PI-II, except that the role of the buyer was played by the computer. All participants in the treatments PIC-I and PIC-II knew 
that the computer would react to their offers as a proﬁt maximizer. The descriptive statistics of the computer treatments 
are summarized in Tables 8 and 9. In both parameter constellations, the shares of sellers who offer a menu or only good A
do not differ signiﬁcantly between PI and PIC. Thus, as in PI-I, the vast majority of the participants in PIC-I offered a menu. 
Yet, the prices pA and pB were signiﬁcantly larger than in PI-I (p-values < 0.001). As in PI-II, most participants in PIC-II 
offered only good A, but the prices pA were signiﬁcantly larger than in PI-II (p-value < 0.001).
The distributions of the offers that were made in the computer treatments are depicted by the black circles in Fig. 4. For 
comparison, the orange circles show the offers in the original private information treatments. As explained above, the black 
(resp., orange) curves again delineate the regions in which low- and high valuation buyers buy good A, good B , or no good 
according to standard theory (resp., inequity aversion theory with α = 0.1).
In PIC-I, the most frequently made offer was a menu with pA = 90, pB = 30, which is the theoretically optimal offer. 
This offer was made 14 times. There were 11 sellers who offered a menu with pA = 88, pB = 29, obviously because they 
were not absolutely sure that the computer would really act in their interest in case of indifference. Altogether, 33 sellers 
offered incentive-compatible menus with pA ∈ {88, 89, 90} and pB ∈ {28, 29, 30}. Hence, 45.8% of all menus were roughly 
equal to the theoretically optimal solution. For comparison, in PI-I only one seller made such an offer.
In PIC-II, the most frequently observed decision of the sellers was to offer only good A at the price pA = 70, which 
is the theoretically optimal offer. This offer was made 21 times. Altogether, 42 sellers offered only good A at a price 
pA ∈ {68, 69, 70}. In addition, there were 13 sellers who offered equivalent menus. Thus, 61.1% of all sellers made an offer 
roughly equal to the theoretically optimal solution (whereas in PI-II, only 9.8% of the sellers made such offers).
We can thus conclude that many sellers were able to ﬁnd the optimal solution (doing so was clearly more diﬃcult in 
PIC-I than in PIC-II), and inspection of Fig. 4 shows that several other sellers were not too far away from the optimum.28
24 See also Yi (2005) for a discussion of QRE models of the ultimatum game.
25 For values of α larger than 0.38, less than 80% of the buyer decisions can be explained; for α larger than 0.67, less than 70% of the buyer decisions 
can be explained.
26 See also De Bruyn and Bolton (2008) and Blanco et al. (2011), who also use the QRE approach to estimate other-regarding preferences.
27 Most studies of ultimatum games use a divide-the-pie framing, making payoff comparisons particularly salient. Hoffman et al. (1994) have conducted 
treatments with a divide-the-pie framing as well as a seller-buyer framing, and they have found that results in the latter case are closer to standard theory. 
If we employ the same QRE approach as above to their data, we ﬁnd α ≈ 0.65 in their divide-the-pie treatment, while α ≈ 0.26 in their seller-buyer 
treatment. Our setting with two goods may have further shifted the participants’ attention to strategic considerations, thus making relative payoffs less 
salient.
28 Not all of the noise that remains even in the computer treatments has to be attributed to decision errors. In particular, the sellers may be heterogeneous
with regard to their risk attitudes. Thus, at the end of each PIC-I session, sellers could choose one of three lotteries: (i) 100 ECU or 0 ECU with equal 
probability, (ii) 90 ECU or 30 ECU with equal probability, (iii) 40 ECU for sure. 80.2% of the sellers picked lottery (ii). Among the sellers whose contract 
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Private information computer treatment PIC-I. The stars indicate whether there are signiﬁcant differences (* at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level) between the 
high and the low types.
Menu Only A Total
# Obs. (Share) 72 (75.0%) 24 (25.0%) 96
Mean pA 79.22 72.92 77.65
Mean pB 30.57 30.57
High type:
Buy A 36/38 (94.7%) 10/10 (100.0%) 46/48 (95.8%)
Buy B 2/38 (5.3%) 2/48 (4.2%)
Reject 0/38 (0.0%) 0/10 (0.0%) 0/48 (0.0%)
Mean proﬁt seller 72.16 62.40 70.13
Mean proﬁt buyer [24.68] [37.60] [27.38]
Mean total surplus [96.84] [100.00] [97.50]
Low type:
Buy A 2/34 (5.9%)** 2/14 (14.3%)** 4/48 (8.3%)**
Buy B 29/34 (85.3%)** 29/48 (60.4%)**
Reject 3/34 (8.8%) 12/14 (85.7%)** 15/48 (31.3%)**
Mean proﬁt seller 26.32** 5.64** 20.29**
Mean proﬁt buyer [1.62**] [0.07**] [1.17**]
Mean total surplus [27.94**] [5.71**] [21.46**]
Table 9
Private information computer treatment PIC-II. The stars indicate whether there are signiﬁcant differences (* at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level) between 
the high and the low types.
Menu Only A Total
# Obs. (Share) 33 (36.7%) 57 (63.3%) 90
Mean pA 67.24 69.79 68.86
Mean pB 32.79 32.79
High type:
Buy A 13/14 (92.9%) 31/31 (100.0%) 44/45 (97.8%)
Buy B 1/14 (7.1%) 1/45 (2.2%)
Reject 0/14 (0.0%) 0/31 (0.0%) 0/45 (0.0%)
Mean proﬁt seller 67.21 68.39 68.02
Mean proﬁt buyer [28.50] [31.61] [30.64]
Mean total surplus [95.71] [100.00] [98.67]
Low type:
Buy A 16/19 (84.2%) 23/26 (88.5%) 39/45 (86.7%)
Buy B 2/19 (10.5%) 2/45 (4.4%)
Reject 1/19 (5.3%) 3/26 (11.5%) 4/45 (8.9%)
Mean proﬁt seller 52.58* 60.50 57.16*
Mean proﬁt buyer [9.53**] [1.42**] [4.84**]
Mean total surplus [62.11**] [61.92**] [62.00**]
Hence, a substantial amount of the deviations of the sellers’ offers in PI-I and PI-II from the predictions based on standard 
theory cannot simply be attributed to decision errors. Instead, the sellers anticipate that the buyers will react as analyzed 
above and adjust their offers accordingly.
6. Conclusion
In a large-scale laboratory experiment, we have studied the simplest conceivable mechanism design problem that cap-
tures the main features of the basic adverse selection model with private values, which plays a key role in the vast 
theoretical literature on contracts and incentives. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that a seller who faces a 
privately informed buyer may want to offer an incentive-compatible menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In this 
case, the same total surplus level as under symmetric information will be attained in the good state of nature, while the 
presence of private information reduces the total surplus in the bad state of nature. Overall, our experimental results largely 
conﬁrm the main predictions made by adverse selection theory.
However, in line with experimental studies of the ultimatum game, buyers tend to reject particularly inequitable offers, 
which may be explained by other-regarding preferences. While it turns out that the average strength of such preferences is 
offer roughly equaled the theoretical prediction, 93.9% chose lottery (ii), while 73.0% of the other sellers did so. At the end of PIC-II, sellers could choose 
lottery (i), (ii), or (iii’) 70 ECU for sure. 80.0% of the sellers preferred lottery (iii’). 90.9% of the sellers whose contract offer roughly equaled the theoretical 
prediction chose lottery (iii’), while 62.9% of the other sellers did so. In any case, the vast majority of sellers preferred the lottery that is optimal under 
risk-neutrality. Thus, although risk preferences may explain some deviations from the predicted contract offers, they did not seem to play a major role.
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circles is proportional to the relative frequency with which the offers were made.
relatively small, the fact that there is uncertainty about how a particular buyer of a given type will react to a speciﬁc offer 
is well anticipated by the sellers.
We also ﬁnd that the presence of private information may increase the total surplus in the good state of nature, which 
might be surprising at ﬁrst sight. Yet, the reason for this ﬁnding is that standard theory is too optimistic about the eﬃciency 
of contracting under symmetric information. Once we take into account that particularly inequitable offers are more likely 
to be rejected, the ﬁnding actually follows from adverse selection theory, which predicts that in the presence of private 
information sellers may set substantially smaller prices than they would do in the good state of nature when there is 
symmetric information. Our experiment thus suggests that delineating the scope for eﬃciency improvements due to private 
information when buyers may be resentful could be an interesting topic for future theoretical research.29
Finally, in the contract-theoretic literature the basic adverse selection model has been extended in various directions. For 
instance, theorists have investigated the implications of veriﬁable ex post signals, type-dependent reservation utilities, and 
common values.30 It could be a very promising avenue for future experimental research to explore some of these extensions 
in the laboratory.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2. Let x = (xH , xL) denote the trade decisions xθ ∈ {A, B, 0} that the seller wants to implement for θ ∈
{H, L}, where the decision 0 means no trade. Suppose ﬁrst that the seller wants to implement the trade proﬁle x = (A, B). 
She maximizes her expected proﬁt π pA + (1 − π)pB subject to the buyer’s incentive compatibility constraints
vHA − pA ≥ vHB − pB , (ICH )
vLB − pB ≥ vLA − pA, (ICL)
and the buyer’s participation constraints
vHA − pA ≥ 0, (PCH )
29 In the contract-theoretic literature, it is well-known that the presence of private information can be beneﬁcial in the absence of full commitment power. 
For instance, in an incomplete contracting world, the hold-up problem may be ameliorated when there is private information (see e.g. Schmitz, 2006, and 
the literature discussed there). In contrast, our experimental ﬁndings show that private information may be beneﬁcial even in a traditional mechanism 
design setting with full commitment.
30 See Riordan and Sappington (1988) on how veriﬁable ex post signals can improve contracting. Lewis and Sappington (1989) study models with type-
dependent reservation utilities, which may lead to countervailing incentives. Laffont and Martimort (2002) illustrate how common values may lead to 
non-responsiveness of the incentive scheme. Jullien (2000) analyzes a general adverse selection model with type-dependent reservation utilities and 
common values. See also Carillo and Palfrey (2011) and Angrisani et al. (2011) for interesting recent experiments on trading problems with two-sided 
asymmetric information and pure common values.
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Observe that (PCH ) is redundant, as it is implied by (ICH ) and (PCL ). Now ignore for a moment (ICL ), which will turn out 
to be satisﬁed by the solution. In the relaxed problem, (PCL ) must be binding, because otherwise the seller could increase 
her proﬁt by increasing pB without violating (ICH ). Hence, the seller sets pB = vLB . Note that also (ICH ) must be binding, 
which implies pA = vHA − (vHB − vLB). It is straightforward to check that (ICL ) is satisﬁed given the Spence–Mirrlees condition 
vHA − vHB ≥ vLA − vLB . The seller’s expected proﬁt if she implements x = (A, B) is thus given by π(vHA −(vHB − vLB)) +(1 −π)vLB .
Suppose now that the seller wants to implement the trade proﬁle x = (A, A). In this case, it is optimal for her to offer 
only good A at the price pA = vLA . (Note that equivalently she could offer a menu with pA = vLA and pB ≥ vLB , since the 
Spence–Mirrlees condition is assumed to hold.) Thus, the seller’s proﬁt is vLA . Observe that the trade proﬁle (A, B) yields a 
larger expected proﬁt for the seller than (A, A) whenever vLA < v
L
B + π(vHA − vHB ).
Next, note that the trade proﬁle (B, A) is not implementable due to the Spence–Mirrlees condition. It is also straight-
forward to show that the trade proﬁles (0, A) and (0, B) are not implementable. Moreover, it is easy to verify that under 
our assumptions the trade proﬁles (B, B), (A, 0), (B, 0), and (0, 0) cannot be optimal for the seller. Proposition 2 follows 
immediately. 
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.001.
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